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Abstract
We compare two executable languages: the rewriting logic based speciﬁcation lan-
guage Maude and the higher-order, lazy, functional programming language Haskell.
We compare these languages experimentally on a problem in modeling and rea-
soning about a security protocol for authentication. We explore diﬀerences in how
models can be formalized and analyzed, as well as performance and tool use.
1 Introduction
Building and analyzing models of systems is at the heart of software engi-
neering and many languages and formalisms have been proposed for these
tasks. Rewriting logic has recently established itself as a powerful logical and
semantic framework [23,25,26]. In rewriting logic, a model is formalized as
a rewrite theory modulo equational theories. Rewriting logic, and its mech-
anization in systems like Maude [7,20], Elan [1,2] and Cafe-OBJ [4], has a
number of strengths. These include support for structured theory speciﬁca-
tions, algebraic data types and function speciﬁcation in rich equational logics,
and system support for built-in equations. The Maude system supports the
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high-level formalization of models and their prototyping and analysis. More-
over, it allows reﬂective reasoning where rewrite theories are data manipulated
by other theories, e.g., rules in one theory can be applied by strategies speciﬁed
in another.
Of course, there are other executable languages that share many similari-
ties with rewriting logic, such as data types and the speciﬁcation of functions
by equations. In this paper, we compare rewriting logic with one such com-
petitor: Haskell, a modern functional programming language [15]. Haskell
lacks some of rewriting logic’s features, but oﬀers others, such as higher-order
polymorphic functions and lazy data types. There are also eﬃcient tools for
Haskell such as interpreters and compilers [16]. We compare these languages
and how they can be used for building and analyzing models on a small but
non-trivial problem: formalizing a model of a security protocol for authen-
tication in a distributed environment and using inﬁnite-state space model
checking to ﬁnd attacks. Rewriting logic has been shown to be particularly
well-suited for specifying communication protocols, including those used for
security [9,10]. It is interesting to see if Haskell can also rise to this challenge.
Our goal is to provide a critical investigation of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of these two languages and their tool support. To achieve this, we
have tried to keep our two formalizations as close to each other as possible. Our
comparison then, is an analysis of the main diﬀerences, the reasons for them,
and their eﬀects. For example, we show that lazy data types in Haskell allow
us to formalize inﬁnite objects that must be speciﬁed using metaprogrammed
approximations in Maude. And there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in higher-
order versus reﬂective reasoning in formalizing and coordinating heuristics
and search. On the tool side, we compare the development time and size of
our formalisms as well as runtime performance.
We believe this work should be of interest to the rewriting logic community.
In general, although there are results on how to embed other formalisms into
rewriting logic [19,33], to our knowledge there are no in-depth comparisons
with competing formalisms. We would like to encourage such comparisons
since they help clarify myths and preconceptions about diﬀerent approaches
and bring to light limitations and advantages, as well as commonalities and
diﬀerences. Moreover, comparisons help determine where progress is being
made.
Our work should also be of interest to researchers working on formalizing
and analyzing security protocols. In this community, formal methods play an
important role, in particular, models where protocols are modeled as some kind
of state transition system [3,5,11,18,22,27,28,32]. Although there has been
work on comparing diﬀerent paradigms on examples, there are few studies
where the same model is analyzed in two diﬀerent formalisms, as close as the
diﬀerent modeling languages allow. A better understanding of the diﬀerences
between the various languages and tools would help protocol designers and
consumers of formal methods, who must choose a tool best suited for their
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tasks.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide
background on Maude and Haskell. In Section 3 we explain the authentication
protocol that we use for our case study and its model. In Sections 4 and
5 we present parts of our formalization. In Section 6 we compare the two
formalizations and ﬁnally, in Section 7, we draw conclusions.
2 Background
Here we give brief overviews of rewriting logic and Haskell, concentrating on
aspects relevant for our case-study and comparison.
2.1 Maude
Rewriting logic is an executable logic that extends algebraic speciﬁcation tech-
niques to concurrent and reactive systems. It is a simple, but expressive, logic
that naturally models both static and dynamic aspects of communicating sys-
tems. Rewriting logic is mechanized in the Maude system. The Maude system
supports the analysis of systems using metaprogramming, for example, pro-
totyping systems by deﬁning execution strategies in the logic itself [8].
We brieﬂy outline the key syntactic features of Maude [6], an executable
speciﬁcation language based on rewriting logic, that are essential for our case
study. In a Maude module one can declare sorts, subsorts (specifying sort
inclusion) and operators. Operators are declared with the sorts of their argu-
ments and result, and syntax is user deﬁnable using underscores ‘ ’ to mark
the argument positions. Moreover, operators can have equational attributes,
such as assoc and comm, stating, for example, that the operator is associa-
tive and commutative. These attributes are used by Maude to match terms
modulo the declared axioms.
We will use logical axioms of two kinds: equations, introduced with the
keywords eq or ceq for conditional equations, and rewrite rules, introduced
with the keywords rl and crl. For more details on Maude, see [20].
2.2 Haskell
Haskell [15] is a general purpose, functional programming language incor-
porating many recent innovations in programming language design. These
include higher-order functions, lazy evaluation, static polymorphic typing,
user-deﬁned algebraic data types, pattern matching, modules, and syntac-
tic constructs such as list comprehension. There are good, freely available
Haskell interpreters and optimizing compilers. We used the compiler GHC
[16].
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The most relevant language features for our study are lazy evaluation, data
types, and list comprehension. Lazy evaluation is an evaluation strategy that
ensures that expressions are expanded in a demand driven way and are not
evaluated more than is necessary to provide a value at the “top level”. For
example, the head function head over lists (built from the empty list ‘[]’ and
cons ‘:’) is deﬁned, using pattern-matching, by head (x:xs) = x. Evaluating
head l evaluates l only as far as is necessary to determine if the outermost
constructor is a cons; the head and tail are not further evaluated.
Haskell data types are standard algebraic data types declared by naming
the type and its constructors. As constructors are functions, their compo-
nents are evaluated lazily; such types are sometimes called lazy data types to
emphasize this. As an example, consider how we can model the inﬁnite set of
natural numbers:
nat = from 0
from n = n : from (n+1)
This Haskell program deﬁnes nat to be the inﬁnite list [0,1,2, ...]. We can
now evaluate the head of this list, which forces the computation of from far
enough to produce the ﬁrst element. Evaluation of the remainder is delayed
until forced by further computation.
Haskell supports a notation for specifying (possibly inﬁnite) sets using list
comprehension, which is analogous to set comprehension. Sets in Haskell can
be represented by lists. For example we can represent the set {2×x | 1 ≤ x ≤
10 ∧ x mod 2 = 0} in Haskell as
[2 * x | x <- [1 .. 10], x ‘mod‘ 2 == 0]
which is equal to {4, 8, 12, 16, 20}. The notation [c | t <- xs, p] represents
a set where for each t in the list xs, for which the predicate p holds, we add an
element c to the result set. In general, there can be more than one generator
(expressions like t <- xs) as well as zero or more predicates. Moreover, in
a generator, the term t can be a composite term, called a pattern, which is
matched against each element of xs. Due to technical reasons, patterns in
Haskell must be linear, which means that each variable in t can occur just
once. One can often work around this by renaming common variables apart
and adding predicates that equate them, e.g., translating the generator [x,x]
<- xs (which selects all doubleton lists from xs whose elements are identical)
to [x,x1] <- xs, x == x1. We will see applications of this shortly.
3 Modeling Security Protocols
3.1 Motivation and Background
A security protocol is a recipe that describes how agents (or principals) should
act to achieve some goal. Protocols are often described using informal nota-
tion, for example as a sequence of instructions explaining the actions taken
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by the agents. For example, the following is a typical presentation of a pro-
tocol, in this case, a version of a public-key authentication protocol (NSPK)
proposed by Needham and Schroeder [29]:
A→ B : {A,NA}K(B)
B → A : {NA, NB}K(A)
A→ B : {NB}K(B)
This protocol consists of three steps in which two agents, A and B, exchange
messages in order to mutually authenticate each other.
A step A → B : X states that A exchanges the message X with B.
Messages consist of atoms, like agent names and nonces (randomly generated
strings), and are composed by tupling. Moreover, messages may be encrypted
using an agent’s key. Here, in the ﬁrst step, A sends his name and a nonce
NA to B. The message is encrypted with B’s public key K(B). In the second
step, B sends NA back to A, along with his own nonce NB, encrypted with
A’s public key. Sending NA back authenticates B: for only B could return
NA, at least if we assume: (1) perfect cryptography, (2) that only B knows
his private key, and (3) that other agents cannot guess the nonce NA. B also
sends along his own challenge, the nonce NB, which A returns in the third
step, thus demonstrating that she is really A.
Although security protocols are small and appear intuitive, this appearance
is deceptive. The above protocol was proposed in 1978 and eighteen years went
by before Lowe [17] discovered that, contrary to what was believed, the ﬁnal
step does not authenticate A because B can ﬁnish a run of the protocol with
an agent who is other than she claimed to be in the ﬁrst step. Moreover, in
the attack given in [17], the attacker learns a nonce that is believed to be a
secret between the two honest parties A and B.
The attack is a man-in-the-middle attack with the following steps.
A → Spy : {A,NA}K(Spy)
Spy(A) → B : {A,NA}K(B)
B → A : {NA, NB}K(A)
A → Spy : {NB}K(Spy)
Spy(A) → B : {NB}K(B)
An agent in the role A initiates (unknowingly) a communication with a ma-
licious party (Spy), sending a nonce to the spy. The spy disguises himself as
A and uses this nonce to fake a message to the agent in role B. B’s reply to A
includes a second nonce and ﬁts into the protocol session of agent A. Since A
assumes that the second nonce came from the spy, A acknowledges its receipt
by sending it back to the spy, encrypted with the spy’s key. Thus, the spy
learns the identity of the second nonce, which is intended to be a shared se-
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cret between the other agents. This violates the secrecy property of nonce NB.
The spy can use the nonce to send out the ﬁnal message in B’s protocol run,
making B believe that he communicates with A. This violates the authen-
tication property of NSPK. These kinds of errors, which can be exceedingly
subtle, motivate the need for formal analysis.
3.2 An Asynchronous Knowledge-Based Model
A standard way of modeling a protocol is to abstract away any possible im-
plementation of the steps and only model relevant aspects of the distributed
system’s global state and how the state evolves over time [5]. In our case, the
global state provides an abstract snapshot of the system at some point in time
and is comprised of the local states of each agent, the current messages in the
network, and the knowledge of the attacker. A protocol then is modeled as
a kind of “computation tree” of global states: the root models the system’s
starting conﬁguration, and each node’s successors model diﬀerent ways that
the global state can evolve by a step of (some run of) the protocol or inter-
ference by an attacker. Note that, in general, the tree is inﬁnite: Agents may
engage in arbitrarily many runs of the protocol (which can be interleaved with
runs of other agents) and the attacker can send arbitrarily many messages.
Our model is an adaptation of that used in CIL [11], a speciﬁcation lan-
guage developed as an interface language for various protocol analysis tools.
In this model, the global state consists of (cf. [5,28]):
(i) the knowledge of each agent (his status in diﬀerent protocol runs),
(ii) the messages that have been sent but not yet received (this constitutes
an asynchronous communication model), and
(iii) the knowledge of a possible attacker.
Modeling asynchronous communication means that a protocol step A → B :
X is decomposed into two parts: A sending X to B, and B receiving X. This
reﬂects the fact that communication in real networks is not atomic and all sent
messages need not necessarily be received. Agent knowledge models, for each
protocol run (an agent may take part in multiple runs of the protocol, playing
diﬀerent roles, i.e., A or B in NSPK): which step an agent is involved in; what
his role is; and what information he has learned from the run. Finally, we will
formalize the commonly used attacker model due to Dolev and Yao [13]: the
attacker (also called the spy) controls the network and can read and intercept
all messages. Moreover, he can construct messages from any information he
can extract from messages previously sent on the network (extraction assumes
perfect cryptography, i.e., he can only extract encrypted parts of messages
when he has appropriate keys).
Our model provides a basis for formal analysis: A protocol has some prop-
erty, precisely when the property holds for every global state in the tree (anal-
ogously, a protocol lacks some property precisely when the property fails for
some global state in the tree). In the following sections, we present parts of
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our rewriting logic and Haskell formalizations of the NSPK protocol and how
we formalize and check attacks.
4 Rewriting Logic Formalization
Below we provide some representative parts from our two speciﬁcations. Due
to space limitations, we have omitted many details. Our intention is to give
the reader a feel for the style of the speciﬁcations and provide a basis for the
comparison afterwards.
4.1 Formalizing the Protocol
The most basic data type for cryptographic protocols is a ﬁeld. For our appli-
cation, a Field is either an agent’s name, a nonce, or an encrypted message,
which is a list of ﬁelds. Since we are interested in attacks other than those
based on imperfect cryptography or guessing keys or nonces, we make some
abstractions in specifying these data types. We identify an agent’s name with
his (public) key and we assume that only that agent has the inverse (private)
key, unless it has been compromised. We also name nonces by integers. Here
is the Maude speciﬁcation of the data types involved:
sorts Nonce Agent Field Fields FieldList.
subsorts Agent Nonce < Field .
subsort Field < Fields .
op nil : -> Fields .
op _,_ : Fields Fields -> Fields [assoc id: (nil).Fields] .
op [_] : Fields -> FieldList .
op Nonce_ : MachineInt -> Field .
op Crypt : Agent FieldList -> Field .
There are three agents (including the spy) who can engage in the two roles
RoleA or RoleB.
op Alice : -> Agent .
op Bob : -> Agent .
op Spy : -> Agent .
sort Role .
ops RoleA RoleB : -> Role .
We model the protocol state as a set of facts. A Fact is either the infor-
mation on the local state of an agent (note that the agent is identiﬁed by the
ﬁrst entry in its ﬁeld list and agent states are sequentially numbered), or a
message between agents, or information “on the network”, which can be used
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by the attacker.
sorts Facts Fact FactSet .
subsort Fact < FactSet .
op [_] : FactSet -> Facts .
op mt : -> FactSet .
op _,_ : FactSet FactSet -> FactSet [assoc comm id: mt] .
op State : Role MachineInt FieldList -> Fact .
op Msg : Agent Agent FieldList -> Fact .
op Net : FieldList -> Fact .
As we model asynchronous communication, we formalize each step of
NSPK by two rules: one for sending the message and the other for receiv-
ing it. Hence, the ﬁrst step of the NSPK protocol is modeled by the following
two rules:
rl [sndMsg1] :
[State(RoleA,0,[a,b]),fs]
=> [State(RoleA,1,[a,b,mkNonce(fs)]),
Msg(a,b,[Crypt(b,[a,mkNonce(fs)])]), fs] .
rl [rcvMsg1] :
[State(RoleB,0,[b]), Msg(unknown,b,[Crypt(b,[a,na])]), fs]
=> [State(RoleB,1,[b,na,a]), fs] .
Whenever the global system state records that an agent a in RoleA is ready
to start the protocol with an agent b, the rule sndMsg1 can ﬁre. The result is
a new successor state where agent a records the freshly generated nonce and
a message is added to the fact set. Note that as a and b are variables that
are bound during matching, a successor is generated for every pair of agents
that can start the protocol. Similarly, rcvMsg1 formalizes that when some
unknown agent has sent a message to an agent b, and b can enter the protocol
in the role RoleB, then b can remove the message from the fact set and update
his local state with its content. The variable fs represents all other facts in
the fact set.
We also formalize transitions due to the attacker. Information that can
be extracted from messages sent to, or intercepted by, the attacker are stored
in the global state as data of the form Net l for list of ﬁelds l. We model
possible attacker actions using eight additional rules that intercept messages
(and place them on the net), fake new messages (2 rules), decomposemessages
on the net and place their parts on the net, compose messages from parts (2
rules), and encrypt messages (2 rules). We give two examples here: faking
and encrypting messages.
crl [fake] :
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[Net([a]), Net(l), fs]
=> [Net([a]), Net(l), Msg(Spy,a,l), fs]
if not(spyOf(a) == true) and not(Msg(Spy,a,l) in fs) .
crl [fake2] :
[Net([a]), fs] => [Net([a]), Msg(Spy,a,[a]), fs]
if not(spyOf(a) == true) and not(Msg(Spy,a,[a]) in fs) .
crl [encrypt] :
[Net([a]), Net(l), fs]
=> [Net([Crypt(a,l)]), Net([a]), Net(l), fs]
if not(Net([Crypt(a,l)]) in fs) .
crl [encrypt2] :
[Net([a]), fs] => [Net([Crypt(a,[a])]), Net(l), fs]
if not(Net([Crypt(a,[a])]) in fs) .
fake states that for an agent a on the network and for a message l, the
message Msg(Spy,a,l) is inserted into the global state. The condition assures
that the spy does not send a faked messages to himself and that the message
is new. Note that we have adopted the convention of [30] where the message
source and destination arguments are the true source and intended destination
of the message, and they are not accessible to the receiver of the message.
Hence, Spy is the sender here (and in rcvMsg1 the sender is unknown). The
rule fake2 is similar but allows matching with only one state fact. The rules
for encrypt select an agent a and a message l (which, in the second rule
encrypt2, can be a) and add l encrypted with a’s key to the global state.
These rules formalize the (global) state transitions. The initial state is
modeled as a fact set where Alice can start a run of the protocol, in the
role RoleA, with the Spy and Bob can enter a run of the protocol in RoleB.
Moreover, the names of all agents are on the net.
eq initial = [State(RoleA,0,[Alice,Spy]), State(RoleB,0,[Bob]),
Net([Alice]), Net([Bob]), Net([Spy])] .
4.2 Model Checking
The aim of model checking is to explore the state space for possible attacks.
In problems like ours where the state space is inﬁnite, model checking based
on enumerative search constitutes a semi-decision procedure.
We begin by characterizing what states represent attacks. For NSPK, a
state represents a secrecy attack when an agent has sent his nonce, encrypted,
to another agent (diﬀerent from the spy) but the nonce has been compromised
by the spy, i.e., is on the net.
op attack : -> Facts .
ceq [State(RoleB,2,[b,na,a,nb]), Net([nb]), fs] = attack
if not(spyOf(a) == true) and not(spyOf(b) == true) .
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By applying rewrite rules, Maude can be used to build parts of the com-
putation tree rooted at the initial state. In particular, the Maude interpreter
delivers one particular branch of the computation tree determined by inter-
preter’s default evaluation strategy for applying rules. However, to ﬁnd pos-
sible attacks we need to explore all possible branches.
We proceed by employing Maude’s metalevel reasoning capabilities and
deﬁne, at the metalevel (in Maude), a strategy that speciﬁes how the rules
should be applied. To do this we deﬁne, within a Maude module, a function
that implements an iterative deepening search on a tree speciﬁed, implicitly,
by an initial state and rewrite rules of another (object) module. We then
specialize this to our initial protocol state and the module deﬁning the protocol
rules. In doing so, the protocol speciﬁcation becomes a term on the metalevel
that is passed to, and manipulated by, the search strategy.
Below we show part of our iterative deepening strategy. For a given state,
this strategy performs a rewrite step that generates a successor state. At
each step, we test for an attack or backtrack in case the branch terminates
or the maximum depth is reached. To specify iterative deepening search, we
formalize a function whose arguments are the module in which the reduction
takes place (in our case the NSPK protocol), the current search path (i.e.,
a sequence of steps, where each step is a triple consisting of a rule label, a
Maude-internal substitution number, and the new term), the current depth
of the search tree, the maximum depths, and a list of protocol rule names
(quoted identiﬁer list QIDL).
ceq ids(M,path(APATH,step(L,N,T)),DEPTH,MAX,QIDL)
= if DEPTH < MAX
then (if nextRewrite(M, T, L, QIDL) == none
then backtrack(M,path(APATH,step(L,N,T)),
DEPTH,MAX,QIDL)
else ids(M,path(path(APATH,step(L,N,T)),
nextRewrite(M,T,L,QIDL)),
DEPTH + 1,MAX,QIDL)
fi)
else backtrack(M,path(APATH,step(L,N,T)),DEPTH,MAX,QIDL)
fi
if T =/= {’attack}’Facts .
In theory, iterative deepening can ﬁnd any attack, but in practice heuristics
are needed to do so using manageable resources. Our heuristics are based
on two simple ideas. First, the model contains all possible interleavings of
agent/spy actions. It turns out that there is considerable redundancy: it is
possible to ignore certain interleavings without removing any attacks from
the search space. [12,31] give examples of such heuristics and prove that they
are attack-preserving. Here, we formalize that certain action sequences must
occur as a block (without other interleaved actions). For example, an agent
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receiving a message immediately sends the follow-up message. We formalize
this with a predicate extensionOf, part of whose deﬁnition we present here
(there is an equation deﬁning extensionOf for each rule label). This predicate
is called in order to test a possible new global state.
eq nextRewrite(M, T, QI, (L QIDL))
= if (L extensionOf QI == true)
then if meta-apply(M, T, L, none, 0) == error*, none
then nextRewrite(M, T, QI, QIDL)
else step(L, 0, term(meta-apply(M, T, L, none, 0)))
fi
else nextRewrite(M, T, QI, QIDL)
fi .
eq QI extensionOf ’rcvMsg1
= if (QI == ’sndMsg2) then true else false fi .
The second heuristic is that the actions of faking and composing messages
are only meaningful if those messages can be received (i.e., if a message has
the right format and there exists an agent in the system that can receive
the message). Thus, we ignore faked messages that cannot be received. For
example,
op _isReceivableIn_ : Fact FactSet -> Bool .
eq Msg(unknown,b,[Crypt(b,[a,na])]) isReceivableIn
(State(RoleB,0,[b]), fs) = true .
states that a message is receivable when any agent sends a message to b,
encrypted with b’s key, that contains an agent’s name and a nonce, i.e., is
in the format of the ﬁrst message. In a similar way, we can specify messages
resulting from steps 2 and 3 of the protocol as being the only other receivable
messages, and ignore all non-receivable messages. Formats of messages are
also deﬁned as predicates on net facts.
Note that we implemented the second heuristic at the object level, as op-
posed to the metalevel. We deﬁned the receivability predicate at the object
level and extended the fake, encrypt, and compose protocol rules by con-
ditions that test this predicate, i.e., we incorporated the test in the protocol
rules.
As mentioned in Section 3.1 there is an attack for NSPK that violates the
secrecy of the nonce sent by the agent in role B. This attack is found by Maude
on ply 11 of the search tree using the following sequence of rules: sndMsg1;
intercept; decompose; encrypt; fake; rcvMsg1; sndMsg2; rcvMsg2;
sndMsg3; intercept; decompose. These eleven rules correspond to the ac-
tions described in lines one to four of the attack scenario in Section 3.1. The
ﬁrst two rules describe the ﬁrst line: The attacker intercepts the message that
is sent to him by A. The next two rules (decompose and encrypt) are local ac-
tions of the attacker where he sends a faked message to B. Line 2 to line 4 of the
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attack description are each mirrored by pairs of rules (line 2: fake;rcvMsg1,
line3: sndMsg2;rcvMsg2, and line 4: sndMsg3;intercept). Finally, the at-
tacker decomposes the information from the last message, which reveals B’s
nonce.
5 Haskell Formalization
5.1 Formalizing the Protocol
As in the rewriting logic formalization, we begin by formalizing a data type,
Facts, that encodes the global state.
data Agent = Alice | Bob | Spy
data Role = RoleA | RoleB
data Field = Agent Agent | Nonce Int | Crypt (Agent,[Field])
data Fact = State(Role,Int,[Field]) | Msg(Agent,Agent,[Field])
| Net [Field]
type Facts = Set Fact
Using lazy data types, we can explicitly formalize the inﬁnite protocol
computation tree. This is a tree of arbitrary branching, where each node
contains an element of type a (where a is a type variable later instantiated by
Facts) and a list of zero or more subtrees.
data Tree a = Node a [Tree a]
Similar to the Maude approach, each protocol step corresponds to two func-
tions. We model these as “extension functions” of type Facts -> [Facts]:
given a global state, each function speciﬁes possible successor states after the
action has occurred. Hence the ﬁrst step is modeled by the following functions.
sndMsg1 fs =
[ diff (Msg(a,b,[Crypt(b,[Agent a, Nonce na])])
:State(RoleA,1,[Agent a, Agent b, Nonce na])
:fs)
[State(RoleA,0,[Agent a, Agent b])]
| State(RoleA,0, [Agent a, Agent b]) <- fs]
where na = mkNonce fs
rcvMsg1 fs =
[ diff (State(RoleB,1,[Agent b, Nonce na, Agent a]):fs)
[Msg(unknown,b,[Crypt(b, [Agent a,Nonce na])]),
State(RoleB,0, [Agent b])]
| Msg(unknown,b, [Crypt(b1,[Agent a, Nonce na])]) <- fs,
b == b1,
State(RoleB,0,[Agent b2]) <- fs, b == b2]
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The formalization is similar to Maude’s but uses set comprehension, instead
of associative-commutative matching, to select facts in fs. For example, in
sndMsg1 we select (an instance of) State(RoleA,0,[Agent a, Agent b]).
Given this, we build a successor state by adding to fs the facts Msg(a, b,
[Crypt(b,[Agent a, Nonce na])]) and State(RoleA,1,[Agent a, Agent
b, Nonce na]), and deleting (using diff) State(RoleA,0,[Agent a, Agent
b]). As mentioned in Section 2.2, equality constraints (guards like b == b1)
arise due to Haskell’s restriction to linear patterns. Note that, using matching,
comprehension iteratively selects all such facts and, in doing so, generates a
list of all possible extensions.
Next we formalize the ﬁve extension functions for our attacker model.
Below are the functions for faking and encrypting messages.
fake fs = [Msg(Spy,a,l) : fs | Net [Agent a] <- fs,
not(spyOf(a)),
Net l <- fs,
Msg(Spy,a,l) ‘notin‘ fs]
encrypt fs = [ x:fs | x <- crypt, x ‘notin‘ fs]
where crypt = [Net([Crypt (a,l)]) | Net [Agent a] <- fs,
Net l <- fs]
With fake, for example, we select from fs the name of an agent a, diﬀerent
from the spy, and a message l on the net, and insert Msg(Spy,a,l) into
the global state if it is new. Again, set comprehension generates a list of all
possible extensions, where each extension describes one such possible fake.
To formalize the protocol model itself, we employ a generic function build tree,
which builds a (possibly inﬁnite tree) with root labeled by init and successors
at each ply generated by a function extension.
build_tree extension init = Node init (map (build_tree extension)
(extension init))
initial = [State(RoleA,0,[Agent Alice,Agent Spy]),
State(RoleB,0,[Agent Bob]),
Net([Agent Alice]), Net([Agent Bob]),
Net([Agent Spy])]
nspk = build_tree exts ("initial",initial)
where exts (_,fs) = foldr (λ (l,f) res ->
(label l (f fs)) ‘union‘ res) []
[("rcvMsg1",rcvMsg1), ("sndMsg1",sndMsg1),
("rcvMsg2",rcvMsg2), ("sndMsg2",sndMsg2),
("rcvMsg3",rcvMsg3), ("sndMsg3",sndMsg3),
("fake",fake), ("intercept",intercept),
("encrypt",encrypt), ("compose",compose),
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("decompose",decompose)]
label l fs = map (λ x -> (l,x)) fs
We complete our model speciﬁcation by using build tree to formalize the
model nspk. The extension function iteratively applies (with foldr) each rule
and unions together the results. The formalization is somewhat complicated
by pairing each successor state with the name of the rule applied. This is a
mere convenience for the heuristics we later introduce.
5.2 Model Checking
We have formalized an inﬁnite-state model as a lazy tree. To perform inﬁnite-
state model checking based on lazy state-enumeration, we search the state
space for global states that constitute attacks, constructing parts of the model
on demand.
In Haskell we formulate the secrecy attack as follows:
secB (_,fs) =
or [elem (Net [Nonce nb]) fs
| State (RoleB,2,[Agent b,Nonce _,Agent a,Nonce nb]) <- fs,
not (spyOf a), not (spyOf b)]
We implemented the identical heuristics used in Maude, although our for-
malization is quite diﬀerent. We restrict interleavings (in an attack preserving
way) using a generic function filterPly which takes a predicate p and a tree,
and ﬁlters out all nodes (and their subtrees) where the predicate is false.
filterPly p (Node (l,a) ts) = Node (l,a) (filter (p l)
(map (filterPly p) ts))
nspkOPT = filterPly pred nspk
where extensionOf ("decompose",l)
= l ‘elem‘ ["decompose","compose","encrypt","fake"]
extensionOf ("compose", l) = l ‘elem‘ ["encrypt","fake"]
extensionOf ("encrypt", l) = l ‘elem‘ ["fake"]
extensionOf ("fake", l)
= l ‘elem‘ ["rcvMsg1","rcvMsg2","rcvMsg3"]
extensionOf ("rcvMsg1", l) = l ‘elem‘ ["sndMsg2"]
extensionOf ("rcvMsg2", l) = l ‘elem‘ ["sndMsg3"]
extensionOf (_,_) = True
pred s (Node (l,x) _) = extensionOf(s,l) && chCompose
where chCompose = if (l == "compose" ||
l == "encrypt")
then format (head x) else True
The predicate is based on a function extensionOf that speciﬁes that only
certain successor states are allowed, e.g., that receives are followed by sends,
or that decomposing, composing, and encrypting, must all lead up to a faked
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message. We also achieve some pruning by employing the heuristic chCompose
to check that a message built by a compose or encrypt extension will later
be receivable after a fake.
We model check the optimized search space using iterative deepening
search, ids, which iterates bounded depth ﬁrst search with the bounds 0,
1, 2, ... .
ids pred t = flatten [ idsn n pred t | n <- [0 ..]]
idsn 0 p (Node a _) = if p a then [a] else []
idsn n p (Node a l) = if p a then (a:rest) else rest
where rest = flatten (map (idsn (n-1) p) l)
The result returned by ids is a stream (lazy list) of states for which pred
holds.
With all the pieces in hand, we can now model-check. The command
head(ids secB nspkOPT)
applies iterative deepening search to the optimized tree, and head forces the
computation of the ﬁrst element of the stream, which is returned as the result.
At ply 11 of the optimized tree, we ﬁnd the same attack as in Maude.
6 Comparison
6.1 Qualitative
Here we compare the Maude and Haskell speciﬁcations with respect to three
qualitative criteria: separation of concerns, reusability, and readability. These
criteria were chosen to reﬂect how the languages are used and the qualities of
the resulting speciﬁcations.
Separation of concerns: Conceptually, our approach to model checking
can be subdivided into three tasks: specifying the model, formalizing heuris-
tics, and search. Both approaches separate the tasks diﬀerently. In Haskell,
lazy data types are central to the problem decomposition. They provide a di-
rect formalization of the protocol model as an inﬁnite tree, built from functions
that describe the local state transitions. This formalization is independent of
any notion of heuristics or search. Heuristics can then be seen as tree trans-
ducers that transform one (inﬁnite) model into another. Search functions are
simply generic tree search functions, i.e., the 4 lines specifying ids and idsn.
Under this decomposition, we completely separate the tasks. During execu-
tion, lazy evaluation combines all three: search drives the coroutining of tree
construction and heuristics to incrementally build and explore parts tree that
are most likely to contain attacks.
The Maude speciﬁcation is organized a bit diﬀerently. Whereas in Haskell
all three tasks are implemented at one level, in Maude we use the object level
and the metalevel for diﬀerent tasks. The local state transitions are mod-
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eled as rewrite rules on the object level together with the cryptographic data
types. Maude does not support lazy data type deﬁnitions like Haskell. One
can locally declare evaluation strategies for operators, but full lazy data types
require more sophisticated algorithms (see also Section 7). Instead we used
metalevel search to build the computation tree up to some depth by the step-
wise application of protocol rewrite rules. Heuristics are partly implemented
as separate metalevel functions that are called at each rewriting step in order
to decide whether a valid extension of the search tree is found. They are also
partly implemented using additional conditions added to the protocol rules.
In Haskell, we separated all heuristics from the protocol model. Nevertheless,
our experiments suggested that in both approaches incorporating heuristics
directly into the construction of the protocol model improves model checking
performance (see the quantitative comparison below).
Reusability: As observed above, the speciﬁcation can conceptually be
decomposed into parts. By carrying out this decomposition in the speciﬁcation
language we can reuse the parts for other protocols. In Haskell, all three
parts correspond to functions that are composed by straightforward function
composition. Lazy data types play a role here in allowing us to formalize the
model independently of heuristics and search. The function build tree that
constructs the model, and ids that conducts search, are completely generic.
The speciﬁcation of the protocol steps and heuristics are, of course, protocol
speciﬁc. Moreover, standard higher-order functions (e.g., map, filter, and
foldr) were used to build these parts from simpler functions.
Maude does not provide lazy data types or higher-order functions. As an
alternative, we used parameterized modules and reﬂective programming to
decompose the speciﬁcation. The search strategy for instance, a metalevel
speciﬁcation that takes a module as an argument, can also be reused for other
protocols.
Both parties did a fair amount of debugging, and here the Haskell speciﬁ-
cation proved more ﬂexible. By using generic combinators, the various parts
were easier to adapt for adding debugging information, changing output pa-
rameters, and the like. In Maude the search strategy encompasses about 100
lines of code and a change in the parameters can cascade through the entire
speciﬁcation, thus increasing the development time for extended strategies.
Readability: The two languages oﬀer diﬀerent possibilities for modeling,
which showed their comparative advantages on diﬀerent parts of the speciﬁca-
tion. The use of built-ins in Maude and, in particular, support for user deﬁned
syntax and rewriting modulo lead to a simpler and more intuitive encoding
of the protocol rules than in Haskell. In Maude, associative-commutative
matching lead to a very simple and elegant way of expressing how the global
state is modiﬁed by removing and adding information. In contrast, this was
achieved in Haskell using iterated set comprehension, which amounts to a
technical device to simulate pattern matching patterns modulo associativity
16
Basin & Denker
and commutativity. 2 Moreover, the Haskell formalization was complicated by
technical restrictions concerning linearity of variable occurrences.
In contrast, formalizing the heuristics and search was more straightforward
in Haskell. The use of higher-order functions played a large role here. So did
the use of standard lazy programming paradigms. For example, programming
with “streams of successes” leads to a simple formalization of search: we
formulate search without backtracking by enumerating all attacks and later
forcing (using head) the computation of just one attack. Finally, specifying
everything at just one level (avoiding metaprogramming) made things simpler.
6.2 Quantitative
We now compare quantitatively our two developments. This provides some
indication of the relative ease of modeling and system performance.
However, we begin with a caveat: care must be taken in interpreting the
results. Diﬀerent metrics favor diﬀerent systems and metrics reﬂect only part
of the story. Moreover, some metrics are surprisingly diﬃcult to measure accu-
rately. For example, the two developments took place over an approximately
two week period but we found it diﬃcult to accurately attribute development
time because each of the authors had experience formalizing protocols in their
respective formalism and could reuse parts of previous developments. More-
over, a considerable part of the development was spent trying to match the
other’s model as closely as possible. Even the simple metrics we give are not
problem free. For example, the number of lines is inﬂuenced by layout conven-
tions and there is a tradeoﬀ between development time (e.g., spent optimizing
the model), clarity of the speciﬁcation, code size, and execution time.
Our ﬁrst metric is code size, measured in lines of speciﬁcation.
Total Libraries Stripped Modeling Heuristics Search
Maude 727 159 398 216 77 105
Haskell 313 20 224 88 24 5
Total measures the lines in the entire speciﬁcation, including comments, but
excluding auxiliary libraries (measured in Libraries). The Haskell speciﬁcation
imports deﬁnitions of standard functions like map, filter and elem. In Maude
we import META-LEVEL. Stripped is the size of the speciﬁcation removing all
comments. In the case of Haskell we also removed type annotations, which
serve as a kind of comment (since types are not necessary as the compiler
infers them automatically). The last three columns compare the size of the
model, and the size of the heuristics and search procedures. Note that the
distributions are not quite comparable. In Haskell, the code for modeling
2 And also idempotence, since two instances of comprehension can match the same term.
As a result, we were able to encode attacker actions using one rule in Haskell where, in
some cases (like fake and encrypt), the Maude formalization required two.
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consists of both the rules and the model speciﬁcation with build tree. For
Maude, it is only the rules. Rule application takes place during search and
the code for building the computation tree is counted there.
Overall we can conclude that the Maude protocol speciﬁcation is about
twice the size of the Haskell counterpart. This is partially due to the fact
that Maude currently requires all operations, variables and their types to be
deﬁned. The other signiﬁcant diﬀerence concerns object level (in Haskell)
versus metalevel (in Maude) speciﬁcation of search.
As previously explained, the development times of the two approaches are
hard to measure. From our experience it generally takes about 1.5 times
longer to develop Maude code. In particular, the initial design of the search
strategy and adaptations for diﬀerent variants of those strategies were much
more time consuming in Maude than in Haskell. This is in part because we
had to write Maude code from scratch for standard routines such as traversing
data structures.
At loading time, the Maude NSPK speciﬁcation uses 30MB. This includes
about 1MB for Core Maude, 25MB for the structured version of Full Maude,
and the remainder for the meta representation of our protocol. During run-
time an additional 2MB are used for search. The Haskell program is quite
thrifty with memory. The Haskell compiler produces a C program, which is
further compiled by gcc. The resulting binary uses only 2MB of memory when
searching for the attack.
By design, both approaches result in a search space of the same size. The
following table shows how many nodes are in the computation tree up to the
ply listed, both with and without our pruning heuristics.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Size unoptimized 26 807 31162 1478096 ?
Size optimized 2 3 4 12 37 44 51 66 159 379 652
Below we list execution times, measured in seconds, where the nth column
records the time spent searching a tree of depth n and the ﬁnal column is the
time for an iterative deepening search at all levels until an attack is found (at
depth 11). Test are performed on a 500 MHz Pentium III workstation with
512 MB memory and 512 KB cache. Note that for depths 1–10, the entire tree
is (unsuccessfully) searched. The low run-time at depth 11 is because, due to
the heuristics, the attack is found early on during search.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 all
Haskell unoptimized .01 .11 5.8 349
Maude unoptimized .2 1.2 55 2391
Haskell optimized(1) .01 .01 .02 .04 .25 1.2 1.5 1.7 2.3 7.8 .13 7.8
Haskell optimized(2) .01 .01 .01 .01 .02 .05 .06 .07 .08 .21 .11 .22
Maude optimized .01 .03 .05 .07 .24 .41 .44 .48 1.9 3.0 .17 3.5
We have included two sets of timings for Haskell optimized with heuristics.
The ﬁrst is for the heuristics incorporated as explained in Section 5 where the
unoptimized protocol tree is ﬁrst (lazily) generated, and afterwards heuristics
are applied to prune subtrees. The results surprised us. For the unoptimized
case, Haskell is signiﬁcantly (factor 6-10) faster, and this also holds at ﬁrst in
the optimized case. But what happens after depth 5? The problem turned
out to be somewhat subtle. It is true that lazy evaluation brings together
generation and testing during search. However, in the optimized case, on
deeper plys the vast majority of the generated nodes are pruned. Following
generation by testing means we must ﬁrst allocate memory for the successors,
only to look at them once, and then prune them. To solve this problem, we
modiﬁed our speciﬁcation so that heuristics are incorporated as they are in
Maude: we test before generation, i.e., in the extension function itself we ﬁrst
test whether a composed, encrypted, or faked messages could ever be received.
And if it isn’t receivable, we do not generate it as an extension. This kind
of optimization is analogous to deforestation transformations, which reduce
execution time in functional languages by avoiding building intermediate data
structures. Applying this optimization here had a drastic eﬀect on run-time,
as displayed in the second set of Haskell timings. Again, the conclusion is that
compiled Haskell is signiﬁcantly faster than interpreted Maude.
7 Conclusion
It shouldn’t be too surprising that each approach has its advantages and dis-
advantages. The two languages were each designed with particular domains in
mind where they will excel. Protocol analysis serves as a good case study as
it brings out a number of interesting diﬀerences. For example, for specifying
transition systems, rewriting logic, with its notion of rewriting-modulo, leads
to an exceedingly perspicuous formulation. This support is lacking in Haskell
where we ended up approximating such rewriting by using set comprehension
and auxiliary functions. Conversely, higher-order programming with lazy data
types oﬀer the ability to decompose the speciﬁcation in ways sometimes not
feasible in Maude.
In both formalisms, one can learn from the counterpart, both in terms
of extensions to the language and libraries. Simple changes to Haskell could
make rules more readable. It is a relatively simple matter to lift the linearity
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restriction in patterns (by insisting that variables range over types belonging to
the equality class). Further support for Maude-like speciﬁcations of protocol
rules could be implemented by programming a rule compiler, which would
take protocol rules in Maude-like syntax and generate speciﬁcations of the
form we have given. But it is diﬃcult to achieve the generality of Maude
without making major changes to the language, such as adding in matching
modulo equational theories.
On the Maude side, the comparison shows that such developments would
beneﬁt from library support for common data types and standard metafunc-
tions for search. Eﬀorts are currently underway to design general purpose
search strategies for Maude that can be applied to model checking analysis.
Type reconstruction, planned for the next Maude release, would also ease the
design eﬀorts. There are also interesting questions concerning how easily the
elegance of higher-order programming can be simulated using parameterized
modules in Maude. [14] suggests possibilities in this direction. Finally, Maude
supports locally declared lazy evaluation strategies for operators. We plan to
explore how this feature can be used in combination with strategies to provide
the equivalent of lazy data types.
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